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I. INTRODUCTIONTHIS article will focus on the interplay between an appropriate le-
gal infrastructure (with particular emphasis on an effective bank
regulatory/supervisory framework, and viable domestic judicial
systems and competent, non-corrupt judiciaries) and effective dispute res-
olution mechanisms to resolve successfully investment disputes for the'
broader purpose of facilitating greater foreign capital flows. It will be
argued that the two methods of investment dispute resolution (judicial
and alternate dispute resolution (ADR)) are not conflicting; rather, they
can be reconcilable, or even seen as complementary in many respects.
Further, recommendation for a suitable foreign direct investment (FDI)-
dispute resolution "environment" will be made, including enhanced bilat-
eral investment treaties (BITs) and the development of suitable "public
private" partnerships." These various issues will be treated in light of
recent international developmental efforts such as the UN's 2000 Millen-
nium Developmental Goals1 and the "consensus" reached at the UN's
2002 International Conference on Financing for Development.2
S.J.D., D. Phil., LLD (b.c.). James L. Walsh Distinguished Faculty Fellow in Finan-
cial Institutions Law and Professor of Law at SMU Dedman School of Law. The
author acknowledges, with much appreciation, the research assistance provided by
Mr. Rami El Borai, Research Fellow of the SMU Institute of International Bank-
ing and Finance and of the International Financial Law Unit, CCLS, London, and
a former consultant with the World Bank. This article is based on a presentation
made for a conference on FDI and Dispute Settlement at the Law Centre for Eu-
ropean and International Cooperation (R.I.Z.), University of Cologne, Germany.
That presentation will be published in that conference's proceedings.
1. Heads of State and/or Government of the Member States of the United Nations
gathered at the Headquarters of the United Nations in New York to participate in
the Millennium Summit from 6 to 8 September 2000. The Summit was a historic
opportunity to agree on a process for the fundamental review of the role of, and
challenges facing, the United Nations in the new century. During the roundtable
discussions of the subsequent 2002 Monterrey Consensus, several speakers noted
that such goals have "imposed fundamental responsibilities on governments." In-
vesting in people - including education, health, basic social infrastructure, and so-
cial security programs - is vital for overcoming poverty.
2. This United Nations-hosted conference on key financial and development issues
attracted fifty Heads of State or Government, over 200 ministers, as well as leaders
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The International Conference on Financing for Development was held
under the auspices of the United Nations in Monterrey, Mexico on March
21 and 22, 2002. This conference led to the adoption of the so-called
Monterrey Consensus, which proposes a "holistic" approach to financing
for development 3 and defines long-term objectives to promote financial
and economic growth. Further, the Monterrey Consensus identifies mea-
sures to be adopted, and infrastructures to be reinforced and cooperation
efforts to be made between developing and developed countries. Among
the measures necessary to promote financial and economic growth, this
consensus emphasizes the importance of FDI and its contribution "to-
ward financing sustained economic growth over the long-term."'4
Indeed, FDI is thought to be the dominant form of resource flows and
the primary source of private capital for low-income countries.5 There-
fore, it is important to identify how legal intervention can affect investors'
choices and encourage financial flows in association with FDI. It should
also be noted that a weak financial and related legal infrastructure could
affect the investments made by contributing to their volatility. In other
words, a good level of "financing for development" through the creation
of a favorable climate for FDI requires that developing countries attract
foreign investors by designing appealing laws and a legal infrastructure
that also protects legitimate national social interests. Additionally, devel-
oping countries are encouraged to strengthen their financial sector infra-
structure to capture and maintain capital flows resulting from these
investments.
This article considers the possible impact of the Monterrey Consensus
on the creation of a conducive climate to FDI, with a special emphasis on
both a robust and stable banking law infrastructure and an effective do-
mestic judicial system in developing countries to resolve investment dis-
putes and to attract, from an ex-ante perspective, foreign investors. Part
II of this article analyzes the mobilization of domestic and international
resources necessary to foster economic growth and development. This
mobilization can only be achieved if developing countries enhance their
banking and financial infrastructures, thus increasing the availability of
credit through effective yet sound lending transactions. Indeed, a defi-
cient banking system along with obsolete or non-existing lending instru-
ments can limit capital flows resulting from FDI. As a result, developing
countries will not fully benefit from the reformations they may have un-
from the private sector, civil society and all the major intergovernmental financial,
trade, economic, and monetary organizations.
3. "Our goal is to eradicate poverty, achieve sustained economic growth and promote
sustainable development as we advance to a fully inclusive and equitable global
economic system." Report of International Conference on Financing for Develop-
ment - Monterrey Consensus, 1 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.198/3 (2002), available at
www.un.org/esa/ffd/aconfl98-11.pdf [hereinafter Monterrey Consensus].
4. Monterrey Consensus, supra note 3, 20.
5. See Ewe-Ghee Lim, Determinants of, and the Relation Between, Foreign Direct In-
vestment and Growth: A Summary of the Recent Literature 12-15 (IMF, Working
Paper No. 01/175, 2001).
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dertaken to attract foreign investors. On the other hand, the Monterrey
Consensus highlights the role of the financial infrastructure and banking
system to promote not only needed capital flow, but also the develop-
ment of ancillary capital markets. Therefore, Part III of this article will
analyze the dispositions relating to the creation of an "effective supervi-
sory mechanism, supported by a solid central bank,"'6 as these may relate
to the issue of capital flow and broader capital market development. 7
The study of these various issues leads us to the focal point of this arti-
cle in Part IV: effective dispute resolution. Indeed, mobilizing resources,
both domestic and international, and strengthening the financial infra-
structure through the enhancement of the banking system brings forth
the issue of effective investment dispute settlement mechanisms. In this
respect, it is important to understand that arbitration is not functional
unless it is associated with a suitable legal infrastructure, which would
include (among other components) 8 a competent, predictable, and unbi-
ased domestic judiciary system. On this latter point, arbitration is not a
substitute for an operational judiciary system; rather, it is a complement
to and is significantly dependent on the efficacy of such a system. For
example, not only would foreign investors avoid referring their disputes
to a faulty domestic judicial system, but would also be reluctant to use
such a structure to enforce arbitral awards. As a result, ADR mecha-
nisms, particularly arbitration, cannot survive without sound judicial re-
forms in developing countries. Where the domestic court system fails to
address foreign investors' concerns, arbitration would prove of little use
in supplying sufficient procedural assurance to investors. A second key
point in Part IV relates to the necessity, from a developmental perspec-
tive, to adopt more effective measures regarding dispute settlement pro-
cedures between firms and governments. These include more
comprehensive BITs prescribing convenient locations for international
arbitration and significant reductions in the cost of arbitration, which
have so far deterred developing countries from more fully using this
recourse.
In conclusion, Part V of this article will provide an overview of the
necessity to encourage "public/private partnership(s)" so as to foster de-
velopment and poverty alleviation in the South. These various efforts
may be instigated by the main international financial institutions (IFIs)
and/or regional financial institutions (RFIs) through actual co-financing
and cooperation programs. This may also be done at the initiative of de-
veloping countries, through technical assistance, and by creating an at-
6. See Monterrey Consensus, supra note 3, $ 17.
7. Financial sector legal reforms over the past decade by 1FIs and RFIs have revealed
that a sound and viable banking sector needs to be in place to support the develop-
ment of longer-term capital (such as securities investment) markets.
8. The other components would include modern commercially-oriented laws condu-
cive to encouraging and supporting FDI, transparent and fair administrative
processes (with judicial review), and effective, but fair enforcement mechanisms -
all within a competent, non-corrupt overall "rule of law"-based governmental
system.
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tractive atmosphere to foreign private and public sectors. From a general
developmental perspective, one should mention that a successful moni-
toring of the Monterey Consensus would most probably encourage devel-
oping countries to strengthen their judiciary systems, thus encouraging
more foreign capital flows. Additionally, in the follow-up process9 of the
"Bretton Woods Institutions," the United Nations and other stakeholders
are likely to facilitate the overall process of development while under-
scoring the decisions taken by the UN's Development Committee and
resolutions of the UN General Assembly adopted in 2002. It is also note-
worthy that there was active involvement by the Director-General of the
World Trade Organization (WTO), a number of ministers of trade, and
several ministers of development cooperation from donor countries. The
ongoing monitoring of the Monterrey Consensus is viewed as the novel
element that will treat many issues simultaneously, such as those issues
surrounding official financial flows, the external debt of developing coun-
tries, the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF),10 the interna-
tional financial architecture, and the coherence and consistency of the
international trading system in support of development.
II. MOBILIZATION OF RESOURCES
A. NEW COMMITMENTS
In order to implement effectively the Monterrey Consensus, it is im-
portant to mobilize domestic and international resources.11 Domestic re-
sources are deemed a vital prerequisite for development and may not be
substituted by external assistance. In this respect, the Monterrey Consen-
sus identifies several actions that should be undertaken by developing
countries to allow a positive impact of foreign capital flows, a fortiori for-
eign direct investment. Among these measures, one can cite the "coher-
ence and consistency of macro-economic policies, increasing productivity,
reducing capital flight, encouraging the capital sector and attracting while
making effective use of international investment and assistance; building
good governance, and fighting corruption. ' 12 Such efforts are likely to
9. See Global Development Finance, Striving for Stability in Development Finance,
World Bank (2003), available at http://www.worldbank.org/prospects/gdf2003/GDF
vol_1.web.pdf.
10. For further insights on the IMF's involvement in Market Development, see
WORLD ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SURVEYS, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY RE-
PORT: MARKET DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES (International Monetary Fund, Sept.
2003).
11. On the theme of coherence for development, some speakers noted that "although
FDI is important for development, simply attracting FDI does not automatically
imply faster growth. There is a need for complementary domestic policies to link
the operations of foreign firms to the domestic economy and thereby increase its
benefits for the country concerned." See Summaries of Multi-Stakelolder Round
Tables, U.N. International Conference on Financing for Development, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.198/8/Add.4 (2002) [hereinafter Conference].
12. Creating an environment favorable to investment also entails other elements pre-
scribed within the Consensus. These prerequisites may be ranked in a broader
category encompassing fundamental rights such as freedom, peace and security,
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create a considerable burden on developing countries, but also may reit-
erate their commitment to participate actively in the developmental pro-
cess. 13 Indeed, much multilateral aid aimed at reducing poverty and
fostering development without any substantial requirements imposed
upon the recipient has proven to be of limited effect due to a lack of host
country commitment and "ownership."
Historically, the underprivileged position of many countries justified
the unconditional aid, resulting in a considerable waste of resources, with
little impact on foreign capital flows to development. With the endorse-
ment of the Monterrey Consensus, developing countries become as com-
mitted as developed nations to their own developmental process. This
new approach considerably shifts the objectives of developmental efforts,
along with the results to be expected. The mobilization of domestic re-
sources should serve as the barometer whereby the commitment of a de-
veloping country will be measured. Henceforth, multilateral aid will be
provided to developing countries that make a considerable effort to mo-
bilize their own domestic resources. These efforts may consist of im-
proved domestic laws and legal infrastructures with respect to
commercial activities better operational bilateral investment treaties with
effective "stabilization clauses" and political risk insurance for foreign
investors.
B. DOMESTIC EFFORTS
Despite the surge in foreign direct investment in the last decade,1 4 an
effective international regulatory regime for FDI has yet to be created.
As a result, domestic laws and legal infrastructures continue to play a
paramount role in attracting FDI and in fostering the ability of develop-
ing countries to regulate effectively their internal financial and commer-
cial activities for translation into increasing foreign capital flows. In this
context, developing countries should enact flexible rules with respect to
the different types of business enterprises, regulations of capital markets
and capacity (especially of foreign joint-ventures) to engage in business.
The recommendations of the Monterrey Consensus were not limited to
the identification of these key legislative efforts. The Consensus presents
a novel approach to attracting FDI by presenting parties with a more
"goal-oriented" approach to development. This approach recommends
striking a balance between achieving economic growth (and all the ele-
domestic stability, respect for human rights, rule of law, gender equity, market-
oriented policies, and commitment to just and democratic societies.
13. An effective follow-up process should pursue this very approach, which captures
the spirit of the Consensus. It has also been argued during the roundtable discus-
sions that a "common interest in that regard is to turn the concept of mutual ac-
countability into concrete practice at the international as well as at the national
level." Conference, supra note 11.
14. Farhad Noorbakhsh et al., Human Capital and FDl Inflows to Developing Coun-
tries: New Empirical Evidence, WORLD DEVELOPMENT 29 (9), 1593-1610 (2001).
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ments that contribute to development, including FDI) and providing so-
cial protection to the economically disadvantaged.
C. BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES
Parallel to improving the domestic legislative framework in host coun-
tries, the Monterrey Consensus emphasizes the importance of BITs in
attracting foreign investors. 15 The increasing use of BITs during the last
decade 16 demonstrates that the gap left by the absence of a multilateral
investment instrument should be filled. BITs are primarily created to
build an atmosphere of trust between host countries and foreign investors
by defining their rights and duties. More importantly, BITs form the ba-
sis for resolving investment disputes between the host country and the
investor's home country. In doing so, they create a binding obligation
(more so for the host country) whose breach, not only constitutes a
breach of treaty with the investor's home country, but also a violation of
international law with ensuing consequences and negative effects on the
host country's reputation.17
D. INSURANCE AGAINST RISKS
In addition to their traditional functions, BITs seek to protect against
unexpected prejudicial change. Although commitments made by the host
country would probably insure investors against only foreseeable risks
and changes at the time such pledges are made, this trust building process
is essential to attract foreign capital flows. In practice, developing coun-
tries give assurances in their legal and financial systems against substan-
tial changes that may harm foreign investors' business.18 In addition,
international arbitration and "stabilization clauses" may insure foreign
investors against the partiality or inefficiency of developing countries' do-
mestic judicial systems, respectively, while ensuring that current legal
provisions regulating foreign investments will either stay in force, or at
least be amended in a way that will not harm investors' interests. The
Monterrey Consensus addresses some of the most common concerns of
foreign investors and stresses the importance of finding effective reme-
dies to address these anxieties. 19
Beyond the scope of BITs, developing countries may seem more attrac-
tive to foreign investors if they can provide political risk insurance. Such
15. "Other mechanisms, such as public/private partnerships and investment agree-
ments, can be important." See Monterrey Consensus, supra note 3, 1 21.
16. See L. Eric Peterson, Emerging Bilateral Investment Treaty Arbitration and Sustain-
able Development, International Institute for Sustainable Development 3 (2003).
17. See id. at 19.
18. PAUL E. COMEAUX & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, PROTECTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL ASPECTS OF POLITICAL RISK 144-46 (Oce-
ana Publications, Inc. 1997).
19. "To this end, it is important to provide export credits, co-financing, venture capital
and other lending instruments, risk guarantees, leveraging aid resources, informa-
tion on investment opportunities. . ." Monterrey Consensus, supra note 3, 9 22.
MONTERREY CONSENSUS
insurance would protect foreign investments against the broader risks as-
sociated with the political life of the host country, including a change of
government or political orientations, expropriation, loss of assets, cancel-
lation of agreements with the government (or forced re-negotiations), na-
tionalization, repossession of equipment, capital controls, currency
inconvertibility, and the like. Although political risk can be insured
against,20 insurance has its limits. Premiums may be high and some risks
may be completely uninsurable. In addition, insurability requires a clear
and verifiable event that causes a payout. Governments rarely engage in
explicit nationalization of the property of a foreign firm. Rather, they
may take a series of actions that have the cumulative effect of destroying
the value of the firm's investment. This is referred to as "creeping expro-
priation. ''21 The Monterrey Consensus tries to foresee and to prevent
such actions that are irreconcilable with developmental objectives. The
commitment of developing countries to engage in productive economic
policy should be sufficient to prevent these actions from taking place.
E. DEVELOPMENT AND EQUAL TREATMENT
Domestic efforts are important so long as international resources are
being equally mobilized, especially private capital flows. Compared with
other sources of financing, private capital flows seem to have the greatest
impact on poverty alleviation in developing countries. Statistics show
that private capital flows to developing countries are as much as ten times
greater than official development assistance flows during the period 1995
to 2000.22 In addition to increasing the rate of investment that usually
accompanies such capital flows, domestic savings are also subject to a
considerable rise. These benefits would help in poverty reduction, while
promoting a sound approach in financing the development of many low-
income countries. The Monterrey Consensus specifically stresses the im-
portance of international private and public resources in order to achieve
the Millennium Development Goals.
Although the mobilization of international resources was the focal
point of the conference, and certainly the foundation of many develop-
mental projects, the Monterrey Consensus also addresses the important
issue of equality of treatment in developing countries. Despite significant
amounts of development assistance spent every year to fight poverty,
there is a large disparity in flows of international aid between recipients.
It has been demonstrated that 80 percent of foreign capital flows are re-
20. American firms can obtain insurance from the Overseas Private Investment Cor-
poration (OPIC). Firms from other countries can seek insurance from Lloyds. The
World Bank also offers insurance against events like expropriation, revolution,
war, and terrorism through its Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency
(MIGA).
21. ECONoMIc DEVELOPMENT, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE LAw 204 (Robert
Pritchard ed., 1996).
22. MORAN THEODORE, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT: THE
NEW POLICY AGENDA FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND ECONOMIES IN TRANSI-
TION 24-27 (1998).
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currently destined to only a handful of countries. 23 These countries could
successfully insure foreign investors against eventual risks to their invest-
ments due to their 'reasonably' stable political and social infrastructure.
This uneven flow can lead to even greater developmental gaps between
low-income countries. Through its consensual character, the Monterrey
Consensus seeks to reach a new equilibrium in terms of assistance and
support to developing countries. A country's credit rating, a rather rigid
and formulaic assessment, would play a less determinative role in assess-
ing the assistance needed. The more objective approach put forward by
the Monterrey Consensus could encourage developing countries to un-
dertake positive reforms, leading to the enhancement of their social, fi-
nancial, and political infrastructures and thereby appearing more
attractive to foreign investors.
Under broader terms, the Monterrey Consensus urges the design of a
more sensitive and constructive mode of delivering international aid.
These requirements seem even more consequential considering the inad-
equacy of current BITs2 4 and investment constraints imposed by foreign
investors during the negotiation process. Current investment practices do
little to truly improve developing countries' social and financial infra-
structures. Their legitimate interests ought to be prioritized in the future
where both developing countries and foreign investors can benefit from
the wealth they jointly create.
III. REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF
THE BANKING SYSTEM
A. BANKING INFRASTRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
Given the rapid expansion of capital markets and foreign capital flows
the Monterrey Consensus rightfully suggests the adoption of "transparent
regulatory frameworks and effective supervisory mechanisms" of the
banking system in developing countries. The Monterrey Consensus adds
that such a model shall be supported by "solid central banking." Due to
the rather broad language of the Monterrey Consensus, details regarding
previous experience references to best practices are not specified. Yet,
where most economic and financial activities are driven by fierce domes-
tic and international competition and left to market forces, the banking
sector has always been heavily regulated. In developing countries, effec-
tive banking regulation is necessary to ensure a robust and efficient bank-
ing sector, which can in turn enable further economic growth.
Furthermore, effective banking regulation and supervision are primary
elements in attracting foreign investors. The objectives of the Monterrey
Consensus will be explored in light of international efforts to stabilize the
global financial infrastructure and the promotion of sound banking prac-
23. FINANCING FOR DEVELOPMENT: PROPOSALS FROM BUSINESS AND CIVIL SOCIETY
32-33 (Barry Herman et al. eds., 2002).
24. Few BITs address sensitive issues such as market failure nor include transparency
provisions.
MONTERREY CONSENSUS
tices in developing countries. It will also highlight the role of interna-
tional financial institutions (IFIs) and the possible expansion of their
competence in the area of banking regulation.
B. BANKING REGULATION
In general, banking regulations determine the range of products and
services in which banks may engage. Banking regulations govern banks'
assets and liabilities, forms and organizational structures, minimum capi-
tal requirements, legal reserves, and the like. The rationale behind such
regulations is twofold. First, protecting foreign and local investors against
eventual fraud or abuse is of paramount importance. In the context of
the Monterrey Consensus, these concerns may relate to the efforts made
by developing countries to protect investors' rights and subsequently to
create an overall environment of trust. A second reason stems from the
desire to prevent, or at least limit, the effects of banking crises-either
individual or systemic. These crises usually provoke waves of financial
instability that can be detrimental by way of "contagion effect" to other
nations, especially developing countries. 2 5 The Monterrey Consensus en-
courages more effective regulation of the banking sector given its relation
to economic growth and development.26 Additionally, a robust regula-
tory framework should encourage banks in the host country to assume
greater economic and financial responsibilities commensurate with in-
creases in capital. With extended operational competence, foreign inves-
tors can use valuable lending instruments and investment techniques.
This process would transform domestic markets in developing countries
into appealing venues for capital flows and provide the foundational sup-
port for a country to develop ancillary capital markets.
C. BANKING SUPERVISION
Having set the broader context and meaning of banking regulation as
referenced in the Monterrey Consensus, it is now appropriate to envisage
the dynamic between banking regulation and banking supervision. Most
significantly, to realize the objectives of the Consensus, it is important to
understand the interplay between successful financial sector reforms and
how the intervention of IFIs can attract foreign investors. While effective
banking regulations are a pre-requisite to achieving stability in domestic
and international financial markets, banking supervision is an important
enforcement mechanism. Although the Monterrey Consensus does not
25. Developing countries would be better prepared to face, and find timely remedies
against, financial crisis if their banking systems were appropriately designed and
included coherent preventive measures. These measures would translate into em-
powering the regulatory and supervisory authority (whether a central bank or in-
dependent agency). Furthermore, the occurrence of the Asian crisis in 1997-1998
has emphasized the importance of the banking system to the economy and its im-
portance in generating economic growth, especially in emerging economies.
26. Manuel Gutian, Dealing with Banks in Distress, in CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES AF-
FEcrING CENTRAL BANKS 176-78 (Robert Effros ed., 1998).
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outline the elements that contribute to establishing a sound regulatory
and supervisory mechanism, a suitable legal framework is essential to
achieve such a result. This would provide the endowment of financial
institutions in the host country with the necessary flexibility to accommo-
date foreign investors, protect their legitimate interests, and allow them
to collect the financial returns they have earned from their investments.
For this mechanism to function properly supervisors should be exper-
ienced and independent, yet accountable before the executive, judicial,
and legislative authorities of the country. This requires an infrastructure
built on transparency and good governance, with effective involvement of
legitimate and competent institutions in the decision making process.
These pre-conditions, however, seem rather difficult to fulfill in devel-
oping countries, which are traditionally impeded by their weak institu-
tional environment,27 poor governance, and limited powers of banking
supervisors. In this respect, it would be reasonable to infer that the Mon-
terrey Consensus operates a "renvoi"28 to the most common and interna-
tionally recognized sources of banking regulation and supervision: the
"Bretton Woods" sisters, and to a greater extent, the Basel Core Princi-
ples for Effective Banking Supervision and related Basel Committee pro-
nouncement respecting international bank supervisory standards.
D. BASEL CORE PRINCIPLES
The financial crises in many European, Latin American and Asian
countries initiated extensive bank reform programs. The G-10, in collab-
oration with other countries, launched a series of reform programs that
endeavored to draft international standards and guidelines on banking
supervision to be implemented on a global level. This work resulted in
what is now called the Basel Principles for Effective Banking Supervision.
27. A weak institutional environment exists where at least one of the following ele-
ments is present: (a) there is no clear differentiation of powers/roles/jurisdictions
among the three branches of government and the system of checks and balances is
ineffective, or (b) there is no well-established tradition or effective framework for
appropriate enforcement of the law.
28. World Bank, Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision - Basic Commit-
tee on Banking Supervision (Sept. 1997), available at www.worldbank.org/wbi/
banking/finsecpolicy/finsecissues/pdf/basic-core.pdf [hereinafter Basic Core Princi-
ples]. The Consensus is written under rather generic terms, because it would have
been more difficult to reach a consensus on detailed provisions. It is therefore
reasonable to believe that for each section it contains the Consensus systemically
refers to external sources of international law. With respect to banking regulation/
supervision, the Basle Core Principles may be perceived as the authority source.
Furthermore, Principle 1 of the Basle Principles reads inter alia "... It is suggested
that the IMF, the World Bank and other interested organizations use the Princi-
ples in assisting individual countries to strengthen their supervisory arrangements
in connection with work aimed at promoting overall macroeconomic and financial
stability." Press Release, Bank for International Settlements, Core Principles for
Effective Banking Supervision (Apr. 9, 1997). This disposition invites the study of
the involvement of these institutions in the process of standard setting with respect
to banking regulation/supervision.
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Although these Principles are only recommendations 29 and serve as a
"basic reference" 30 on banking regulation and supervision, they have cer-
tainly gained recognition on a global level. However, their non-binding
character hinders implementation and enforcement, especially in devel-
oping countries. Developing countries typically argue for the incompati-
bility between their financial systems and the Basel Accord. While it is
true that developing countries encounter more difficulties than developed
countries in complying with the Basel Principles, such difficulties are an
inherent part of the developmental process to which developing countries
have committed themselves. In light of this reluctant approach in adopt-
ing globally recognized banking standards, other alternatives may be nec-
essary to foster reforms in developing countries.
E. IMF AND WORLD BANK INTERVENTION
Many developing countries and emerging economies recognize the im-
portance of the work of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,
yet they remain reluctant to implement the Basel Core Principles and
related pronouncements. In response, in 1997 the G-10 countries sought
to design approaches that would improve the rate of implementation
among low-income countries. The first approach actively engaged the
IMF and the World Bank in requiring the implementation of the Basel
Principles as part of their conditionality and technical assistance pro-
grams. Although the "Bretton Wood sisters" relied heavily on the Basel
Core Principles in designing aid packages, compliance through condition-
ality was quickly abandoned. This compulsory approach threatened the
ultimate goal of both the World Bank and the IMF, which covers broader
developmental issues than simply enhancing banking supervision. Fur-
thermore, the long-term viability of these institutions depends on the bor-
rowing of developing countries: a viability that could be threatened by
compulsion.31 The second alternative was to develop assessment pro-
grams to measure compliance with the Basel Accords. Functioning as
more than just a compliance indicator, this methodology of assessment
would be useful to supervisors in developing countries to detect weakness
or gaps in their regulatory and supervisory frameworks. These assess-
ments expanded in scope and are now known as the IMF and World
Bank "Financial Sector Assessment Programs" (FSAP).3 2
On a final note, a newly proposed Basel Accord (Basle II) was to be
ratified in 2004. However, due to its complexity and the substantial revi-
29. In this respect, Principle 25 divides the content of the Basle Core Principles into
two categories. The first is the minimum standards to which countries are urged to
abide. The second category includes complementary measures that countries may
freely adopt in light of their developmental pace. Id. at 41-42.
30. See JOSEPH NORTON, FINANCIAL SECTOR LAW REFORM IN EMERGING ECONOMIES
100 (2000).
31. WILLIAM LOVETr, BANKING AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS LAW 78-82 (1997).
32. FSAP traditionally include five areas of study. These areas are Banking Supervi-
sion, Payment System, Insolvency and creditor's rights, Anti-Money Laundering,
and Corporate Governance.
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sions since made, its ratification has been delayed until 2006. Basel II
includes additional areas of control33 so as to efficiently handle a growing
and complex international financial infrastructure. This new capital ade-
quacy framework for banking institutions will face great resistance by de-
veloping countries due to its increasing complexity in implementation. In
reality, Basel II will most probably prove itself inapplicable to the more
basic environment found in developing countries.
IV. INVESTMENT DISPUTES SETTLEMENT
A. OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES
Although the Monterrey Consensus does not explicitly refer to the set-
tlement of investment disputes, several of its recommendations make the
subject relevant to the scope of this article. From its general language of
providing "the necessary domestic and international conditions to facili-
tate direct investment flows," 34 one may reasonably infer that effective
dispute resolution mechanisms are an essential part of these conditions.
A "stable and predictable investment climate, with proper contract en-
forcement" brings forth additional concerns regarding the efficiency and
certainty an investment dispute resolution mechanism should offer to the
parties, so as to encourage foreign capital flows. In this respect, develop-
ing countries should be able to attract greater foreign capital flows
through enhanced domestic judicial systems and judiciaries, thus allowing
for fair and expedient settlements of investments disputes. Although the
majority of BITs contain arbitration clauses to insure foreign investors
against the risks they may encounter, if the resolution of disputes is re-
ferred to a defective domestic judiciary system, then arbitration is a com-
plement to the domestic judiciary system and can certainly not replace it.
In reality, the effectiveness of the judicial system and judiciary is an im-
portant element that foreign investors always consider before undertak-
ing their projects. Not only would the competence and impartiality of
domestic courts facilitate the day-to-day operations of foreign investors,
but it would also ensure that arbitral awards within the host country are
enforced in an adequate and timely manner. Therefore, issues of enforce-
ment are particularly important in understanding the interplay between
the domestic judiciary system and the usefulness of arbitration.
In parallel, arbitration, although a common practice to resolve interna-
tional and domestic commercial disputes,35 may cause further uncertain-
33. These additional areas of control are market discipline and supervisory review.
Combined with banking supervision principles the new Basel II will suggest the
application of new principles in these three areas. For additional reading regard-
ing the New International Financial Architecture (NIFA), see Joseph Norton, Se-
lective Bank and Environmental Developments Supervisory Trends upon Entering
the Twenty-Firsi Century, in 2 CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MONETARY AND FI-
NANCIAL LAW 34 (2003).
34. Monterrey Consensus, supra note 3, 9! 20A.
35. See NON-JUDICIAL DISPUTE SEIILEMENT IN INTERNAIIONAL FINANCIAL TRANS-
ACTIONS (Norbert Horn & Joseph J. Norton eds., 2000).
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ties regarding the settlement of investment disputes. The involvement of
a sovereign party causes certain doubts as to the procedures that should
be followed, the location of the arbitral tribunal, and the enforcement of
the arbitral award. Furthermore, examining arbitration in the context of
the Monterrey Consensus could unearth additional issues relative to de-
veloping countries, such as impediments they may face when resorting to
this type of dispute resolution, which is still unusual to sovereign states.
B. DOMESTIC JUDICIARY SYSTEM AND ARBITRATION
(AND OTHER FORMS OF ADR)
The importance of an effective judicial system and judiciary in the host
country is such that it may constitute either a deterrent or a motivation to
foreign investors to pursue their projects and investments. The primary
concern of the latter is the possibility of facing a domestic court system
that may undermine overriding legal principles such as fairness and jus-
tice. Under a deficient judiciary system, courts are likely to be prejudiced
in resolving investment disputes and might systematically favor their gov-
ernment or locals from the host country. This quasi-irrefragable pre-
sumption of favoritism could lead to situations where foreign investors
could hardly argue their cases fairly and would be far less able to collect
on their claims, even when the laws protect their rights. Although consid-
ering that the host country extends procedural guarantees of fairness and
due process, there will always be concerns as to effective enforcement. In
addition, procedural compliance may not be sufficient to prevent politi-
cally motivated decisions that jeopardize the interests of foreign inves-
tors. There are many ways by which domestic courts can favor the host
country surreptitiously, such as encouraging informal delays, purposely
misconstruing the law, inflicting exaggerated fines, and the like. In real-
ity, engaging in such practices is quite easy due to the unfamiliarity3 6 of
foreign investors with the domestic legal system of the host country.
Therefore, unless this system is reliable, competent and impartial, en-
trusting the domestic court system to adjudicate investment cases, where
considerable amounts are often disputed, may induce foreign investors to
take unnecessary risks. Such a system is necessary to address three major
concerns. First, impartial and competent domestic courts may be needed
to adjudicate the disputes that arise from the day-to-day operations of
foreign investors. These disputes include all commercial transactions and
sales of goods and services concluded between the investor and a domes-
tic party (whether an individual or company). Granting a quick and im-
partial settlement of these disputes to foreign investors will give the latter
sufficient "legal security" and incentive to engage in these occasional, yet
36. To mitigate their ignorance of the local legal system foreign investors will either
undertake extensive studies regarding all aspects of domestic laws in the host
country or assemble an impressive legal arsenal (in house legal department or pro-
fessional law firms) to handle all legal matters. Either solution would result in
significant costs, sometimes large enough to reverse the incentives underlying the
investment at stake.
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necessary, activities. Thus, the domestic court system governs the rela-
tionship between foreign investors and internal market players. This
functional aspect, although not totally unrelated, should be disassociated
from the second concern. That is, impartiality and competence should
also be extended to the settlement of investment disputes per se, where
there is a conflict of interest between the government or local in the host
country and the foreign investors. The issues that may stem from this
situation are usually different from those resolved in the context of the
internal market. Yet, both interventions of the judiciary require a certain
amount of fairness and expediency to attract foreign investors. The third
and most important aspect of a sound judiciary system is the enforcement
of either judicial decisions or arbitral awards.
In the first instance, the judicial system in the host country may be fair
and expedient. Foreign investors will be able to litigate their cases before
domestic courts and obtain favorable judicial decisions. Nevertheless,
and despite the competence of the judges who adjudicate the cases, a
given "operational" code in the host country may prevent foreign inves-
tors from enforcing judicial decisions rendered in their favor. These im-
pediments result from a weak executive mechanism of enforcement,
implicit immunities to a certain group of individuals due to their relation-
ships with the authorities, or most commonly, a highly corrupt environ-
ment that renders all enforcement efforts futile.
With respect to arbitration, the circumstances would not differ greatly.
While it is true that arbitration is often viewed as a good alternative to
the domestic judiciary system, it does not supersede, far less replace, the
latter. Indeed, the intervention of local authorities will still be required
to enforce arbitral awards. Intervention will only take place at a later
stage in contrast with the settlement of investment disputes before the
judiciary system. Yet, arbitration is not sufficient to guarantee a fairer
enforceable award than would the judiciary system. Both paths would
require the intervention of local authorities at a certain stage so as to give
full power to either judicial decisions or arbitral awards. The dependence
of arbitration on the judiciary system somehow breaks the myth of arbi-
tration as the most appropriate "independent" mechanism to resolve in-
vestment disputes. As such, arbitration would be most useful (due to its
classic advantages, such as the expediency of the procedures and the ex-
pertise of the arbitrators) when associated with an effective domestic ju-
dicial system and judiciary. Arbitration may be used to circumvent
disadvantages pertaining to domestic courts, other than impartiality, cor-
ruption or political motivation.
C. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM PROGRAMS
As previously mentioned, a developed, competent and non-corrupt ju-
dicial system and judiciary is not only important to enforce arbitral
awards, but it is also one of the decisive general factors in attracting for-
eign investors. Aware of the role it fulfils, IFIs, such as the World Bank,
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have developed extensive reform programs in the legal and judicial fields.
These programs aim at providing the most accurate assessments and tech-
nical assistance to developing countries, and enable them to enhance
their judicial infrastructure. Such programs are usually tailored to each
country and do not prescribe "one-size-fits-all" steps to create the proper
judicial environment to FDI. However, there do remain some recurrent
themes that arise regarding developing countries and the difficulties for-
eign investors may encounter with their domestic judiciary systems.
Without launching into a thorough analysis of the legitimacy of these re-
form programs, there are three remarks that ought to be made.
First, the independence of the judicial system and judiciary, where sub-
ordination to the executive is considered to be a sign of legal imperfec-
tion, has to be affirmed. To do so, it is necessary to make efforts not only
in the political arena of the host country, but it also entails the formation
of competent and non-corrupt judges who are able to handle cases where
foreign investors are involved with a high degree of integrity and profes-
sionalism. As previously discussed, a corrupt or politically motivated ju-
dicial system is likely to reduce the rate of FDI in the long run because
foreign investors would fear investing in a market where their fundamen-
tal rights are not legally guaranteed. Second, explicit mention of the pri-
vate sector development is provided in the launching of the World Bank
Legal and Judicial Reform program37 as a sine qua non condition for pov-
erty alleviation and development. The documents outlining this program
dedicate substantial discussion to highlight the implications of a "trans-
parent and efficient judicial and other dispute resolution systems, and en-
forcement. '' 38 Finally, the judicial reform program would assess the level
of economic integration necessary to facilitate development and sustaina-
ble growth. To achieve this, the judicial reform program should reach
more developing countries and encourage them into constructive "re-
modeling" of their laws, while eradicating the negative aspects of a weak
judiciary system and weak institutional environment. The reform pro-
gram is considered to be a novel vehicle for improvements as it enables
many countries to attract more FDI and to capture the benefits created
by them.
On a final note, the new commitments stipulated by the Monterrey
Consensus are suitable in light of this type of reform program. Indeed, it
would allow one to assess the degree of determination and commitment
of developing countries that endeavor to undertake positive reforms.
37. See World Bank, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL REFORM: STRATEGIC DIREcrIONS, availa-
ble at http://www4.worldbank.org/legal/leglr/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2003).
38. Id. at 52. According to the report:
Judicial independence has two functions: one is to limit government power
and the other is to protect the rights of individuals. A truly independent judi-
ciary is one that issues decisions and makes judgments that are respected and
enforced by the legislative and executive branches; that receive an adequate
appropriation from the legislature; and that is not compromised by political
attempts to undermine its impartiality.
Id. at 26.
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D. ARBITRATION (AND OTHER FORMS OF ADR)
AND DEVELOPMENTAL CONCERNS
Following the rationale underlying the Monterrey Consensus, develop-
ing countries and foreign investors should commit to the developmental
process, thus transforming FDI into a fair deal for both parties. To do so,
they would be compelled to make some compromises as not to prioritize
their interests beyond reason and necessity. When applying this ap-
proach to arbitration, or other suitable forms of ADR, it would not be
absurd to believe that the resolution of investment disputes (notwith-
standing its form) should obey the same rules governing commitment and
compromises to achieve development. In other words, arbitration should
enable both parties to benefit from its advantages without being unlaw-
fully burdened by its costs. To assess whether each party benefits from
arbitration one has to weigh the pros and cons. The case for foreign in-
vestors gravitates towards arbitration as the preferred mode to settle in-
vestment disputes. In contrast, developing countries may be reluctant to
resort to arbitration, or other forms of ADR, for two main reasons.
First, arbitration procedures, as referred to in most BITs, are prohibi-
tive with respect to the costs they engender. 39 Indeed, each party to the
arbitration proceeding is in charge of the cost. This includes the setting of
the arbitral tribunal, the fees of the arbitrators, and often other additional
expenses such as experts, traveling expenses, translations of evidentiary
documents, and the like. In sum, the arbitration process may end up cost-
ing considerable amounts to developing countries. While such costs are
prohibitive for the latter, foreign investors are often prosperous, large
multinationals with numerous subsidiaries and branches and can afford
the costs imposed by arbitration. In this respect, issues of inequality of
treatment may arise since foreign investors will always have the upper
hand in deciding whether to resort to arbitration and may use this option
as a bargaining tool against developing countries.
Second, developing countries may have little expertise in arbitration
matters and may lack highly skilled litigants with expertise in interna-
tional investment and arbitration procedures. Combined with the sub-
stantial cost of arbitration this may lead to out of court settlements where
developing countries are usually disadvantaged. Despite the fact that in-
ternational law seeks to protect foreign investors, developing countries
are the more vulnerable party in investment agreements. So far, arbitra-
tion and other ADR procedures have not been tailored to resolve invest-
ment disputes between powerful foreign investors and weaker developing
countries. The procedures fail to balance the rights and duties of each
party, thus creating an unequal dispute resolution mechanism. On an op-
timistic note, the Monterrey Consensus may restore an equilibrium to
FDI and to all the issues relating to it, including arbitration and other
39. PAUL E. COMEAUX & N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, PROTEcIING FOREIGN INVESTMENT
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 307-309 (1997).
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dispute resolution mechanisms. It is vital to strike a balance between de-




Another developmental tool often marginalized is the use of public-
private partnerships to foster economic growth in developing countries.
Public private partnerships are schemes built on a steady structure, which
involve a host party, a foreign party, and a third party, usually IFIs and/or
a NGO. The host and foreign parties may be represented by either their
respective public sector and/or institution having governmental authority
or by a private enterprise. The extent of their involvement may stretch
from passive participation in the project to an active, leading role in it.
Nevertheless, the most important element that makes public-private part-
nerships an advantageous vehicle for development is the assurance
brought by the third party to the transaction. Indeed, IFIs have long ac-
knowledged their roles in promoting sound developmental projects by
fostering the cooperation between, most commonly, host governments
and foreign investors. Encouraging this type of partnership not only ben-
efits the parties in the transaction but also attracts more investors to de-
veloping countries.
The presence of the third party may take various forms. It can diverge
from a simple role of supervision to an actual financial involvement in the
project at stake. In this respect, one has to mention the co-financing pro-
grams undertaken by the World Bank and its affiliate International Fi-
nance Corporation (IFC), which have so far attracted numerous
investments to the most unprivileged regions such as sub-Saharan Africa.
Other regional institutions have developed their own tools to promote
public-private partnerships. Among these, one can cite the Asian Devel-
opment Bank (ADB) and its co-financing programs, which aim at financ-
ing from sources other than the borrower or project sponsors to augment
the assistance provided. Other funds may come from commercial finan-
cial institutions, official funding agencies, export credit agencies, and the
like.
Although public-private partnerships have been known for well over a
decade, the surge of international developmental efforts, such as the Mil-
lennium Development Goals and the Monterrey Consensus, underscore
the importance of the involvement of the private sector in alleviating pov-
erty. Nonetheless, there are several factors that should encourage public-
private partnerships to better serve developmental objectives. Primarily,
the public sector alone has proved incapable of providing a sustained de-
velopment level to poor countries. The private sector is more able to
channel capital flows and to help achieve tangible results in the short run.
In light of the economic interdependence between nations, and the eco-
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nomic downturn40 after "September 11th", the private sector should not
be excluded from the arduous task of financing development.
Equally, the Monterrey Consensus appears to have revived the debate
on development and international cooperation. Its novel approach invites
developing countries to participate more actively in their developmental
process. Yet, the real challenge the Monterrey Consensus faces is to ad-
dress the channeling of private capital flows in order to serve the eco-
nomic growth of developing countries. This initiative demonstrates two
facts. First, official development assistance alone is not capable of foster-
ing economic growth in developing countries. Second, encouraging de-
veloping countries to undertake positive reforms in the economic, legal
and financial sectors might be better motivated by the private sector,
which is driven by profits. However, there still remain significant chal-
lenges in the next decade. Having set the developmental framework to
which future capital flows will be channeled, one needs now to address
the more delicate issues of implementation and, most importantly, equi-
librium of interests.
This equilibrium is more obvious with respect to issues such as arbitra-
tion and other forms of ADR and the mobilization of domestic resources.
Developing countries and foreign investors should learn to work together
towards the achievement of their respective objectives, which are not nec-
essarily contradictory. Making compromises is the only way to strike a
balance between development and making profits. This formula is not
irreconcilable and will most likely be the norm if the Monterrey Consen-
sus is effectively implemented.
It is widely accepted that IFIs and developmental organizations should
be the "guardians" of implementation of the Monterrey Consensus. Fur-
thermore, inviting private financial flows to foster economic development
may require less intervention as compared to the channeling of public
capital flows. The most important issue remains as to whether foreign
investors will have the capacity to successfully create investment projects
in developing countries while truly contributing to the developmental
process of the host country. Another issue to consider is the possibility
that developing countries, once committed to improvement, may move to
adopt a firmer stance in confronting foreign investors who may be un-
scrupulous to the host country's interests. Hopefully, the Monterrey
Consensus and its follow-up monitoring and implementation will help
change confrontational stances into more cooperative and productive un-
derstandings among developed and developing countries and the private
sector.
40. Organization for Economic Cooperation & Development, Sustainable Develop-
ment: Making Public-Private Partnerships Work (Apr. 28, 2003) (presented by Viv-
ian Lowery Derryck), available at wwwl.oecd.org/forum2003/speeches/derryck.
pdf.
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